The stylized fact of prices increasing more strongly than they decrease in response to identically-sized cost changes, have been confirmed in many empirical studies. However, most of them claim that standard pricing theory cannot account for this phenomenon. Using constant marginal costs and allowing the demand function to be log-concave, this paper shows that the positive asymmetric pricing phenomenon in terms of magnitude can be explained by two of the classic standard economic competition models, Stackelberg with homogenous goods and Bertrand with non-homogenous goods. Furthermore, based on simulations, this paper compares the magnitudes of asymmetry generated in the standard economic competition models. Results show that with a log-concave demand function and constant marginal costs, the magnitude of the positive asymmetric pricing is positively related to the market power. Therefore, the monopoly model is the most asymmetric one, followed by Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertrand.
Cost Pass-Through
The cost pass-through ( ( )) is defined as the ratio of the total change in price ( ) to the total change in cost ( ): = Δ /Δ (non-marginal version), = d /d (marginal version). When the cost pass-through does not depend on , there is no asymmetry, which is the common case when it is assumed that the demand function is linear. However, if the cost pass-through is a function of , there could be either positive or negative asymmetric pricing. If the cost pass-through is an increasing function of , (d /d > 0), prices increase more strongly than they fall in response to identically-sized cost changes. However, if the cost pass-through is decreasing on , the asymmetric response will be negative (prices fall more strongly that they rise).
The Economic Competition Models
In this section, the five competition models under analysis are described. In general, it is assumed that firms producing in the market have the following cost function: ( ) = , which implies constant marginal costs.
Monopoly
For the monopoly case, by using the log-concave demand function, the firm maximizes its profits, (α − βln ( Once is chosen, the price level is determined by the demand function.
Proposition 1: Cost pass-through under the monopoly model, where the demand is log-concave and the marginal cost is constant, is always increasing in cost. Therefore, there is always positive asymmetric pricing.
Proof: Differentiation of the FOC gives 0 = ) , which holds as 2 > 1.
Cournot
For the Cournot case, this paper considers there to be two firms in the market that produce a homogenous good, so the total supply is = 1 + 2 . Assuming both of them face the same log-concave demand, then each firm maximizes its profits: π i = (α − βln ( = c 2 . By solving both reaction curves as a non-linear system of equations, the output level for each firm can be found. Then, the price level is obtained by using the demand function.
Proposition 2: Cost pass-through under the Cournot model with two firms, where the demand is log-concave and the marginal cost is constant, is always increasing in cost. Therefore, there is always positive asymmetric pricing.
Proof:
Adding both FOC equations and differentiating them gives 0 = . Therefore, by replacing the first and second derivative of the price with respect to the output, the cost pass-through is increasing if 2 2 + 3 < 0 , which holds as by construction < 2.
Stackelberg
For the Stackelberg case, this paper considers a leader firm (firm 1) and a follower firm (firm 2). As in Cournot, the total output is the sum of both firms' productions. Stackelberg is a sequential game in which firm 1 moves first and then firm 2 moves, so to calculate the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium we must solve the optimization problem backwards. Firm 2 maximizes its profits, 2 = ( − ( 1 + 2 1−( 1 + 2 ) )) 2 − 2 2 , from which the FOC is − ( 1 + 2 )(1−( 1 + 2 )) = 2 . Generally, from this FOC, the reaction curve for firm 2 can be obtained as 2 = ( 1 ) . Then, firm 1 maximizes its profit by taking the reaction curve of firm 2 as known,
(1−(q 1 +f(q 1 )))(q 1 +f(q 1 )) = c 1 q 1 . By solving this equation, we obtain the output level for firm 1, then by plugging it into the reaction curve for firm 2, we obtain 2 . Finally, by replacing the total output in the demand function, the market price is obtained. , the new expression of ( ) comes immediately after replacing the components.
Proposition 3: Sufficient conditions for the cost pass-through to be increasing in cost under the Stackelberg model with two firms, where the demand is log-concave and the marginal costs are constants and identical for both firms, are: a) Q 2 (1−Q) 2 , the sufficient conditions are immediate.
Bertrand with Non-Homogenous Goods
For the Bertrand model, this paper considers two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, that produce two non-homogeneous goods:
1 and 2 , respectively. Each good has its own price ( 1 and 2 ) and both firms decide the price levels simultaneously.
It is assumed that each good has its own log-concave demand function: P i = α i − β i ln ( , from which the FOC for firm 1 is β 1 (1 + e α 1 −P 1 −δ 1 P 2 β 1 ) − P 1 + c 1 = 0, and, symmetrically, the FOC for firm 2 is β 2 (1 + e α 2 −P 2 −δ 2 P 1 β 2 ) − P 2 + c 2 = 0. By solving both reaction curves as a non-linear system of equations, the price level for each firm can be found.
Lemma 2:
The marginal cost pass-through under the Bertrand model with non-homogenous goods, two firms, identical , and , and a log-concave demand function equals ρ 1 (c) = (1 − δ 1 δ 2 )ψ 1 ψ 2 )(δ 2 ψ 2 − δ 1 ψ 1 ) − (1 + ψ 1 − δ 2 ψ 2 )(δ 1 ψ 1 + ψ 2 + (1 − δ 1 δ 2 )ψ 1 ψ 2 + (1 − δ 1 δ 2 )ψ 1 ψ 2 δ 1 ) ≥ 0 and (1 + 1 + 2 + (1 − 1 2 ) 1 2 )( 2 2 2 − 1 ) − (1 + 1 − 2 2 )( 1 + 2 2 + (1 − 1 2 ) 2 1 2 + (1 − 1 2 ) 1 2 ) ≥ 0, with at least one strict inequality. Proof: For a) and b), the necessary and sufficient conditions follow by differentiating each expression for marginal cost pass-through from Lemma 2 with respect to c.
Simulation Setup
To analyse the asymmetric cost pass-through in the models described in Section 2, this paper simmulates the price response to 25 different values of that range from 0.1 to 2.5 with increments of 0.1 for each . The simulations were performed by using the Matlab software. For all the models, it is assumed that 1 = 2 = , 1 = 2 = and 1 = 2 = . For each model, this paper has generated 2116 different log-concave demand functions such that ∈ [0.5,5.0] and ∈ [0.5,5.0] both of them with increments of 0.1 for each value. Figure 1 shows the demand curve is well-behaved even for extreme values of and .
For the Bertrand model, this paper has considered five scenarios that allow the evaluation of the price responses not only for the case in which both firms charge the same price, but also the cases when there is a differentiated substitution between the two non-homogenous goods and, thus, there are two prices: i) 1 = 2 = 0.9, ii) 1 = 2 = 0.95, iii) 1 = 2 = 0.99, iv) 1 = 0.99, 2 = 0.95 and v) 1 = 0.99, 2 = 0.90. It is clear from these values that each demand is assumed to be more responsive to own-price.
To solve the optimization decision of the firms, this paper used the fmincon Matlab procedure by minimizing the negative of the profit function with an initial value close to zero. To solve the nonlinear systems of equations, this paper used the Newton-Raphson method (Note 11) that comes incorporated in the Matlab software, with initial values close to zero to ensure convergence.
Results

Analysing the Outcome of Six Specific Demand Functions
Before analysing all the simulations results as a group, this paper will focus the analysis on only six demand cases: i) = 0.5, = 1.6, ii) = 1, = 2, iii) = 2, = 2.5, iv) = 3, = 3, v) = 4, = 3 and vi) = 5, = 4, for the monopoly, Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertrand with 1 = 2 = models.
First, to illustrate whether there is asymmetric pricing or not, and in case there is, whether this is positive or negative, figure 2 shows the non-marginal cost pass-through for the demand cases analysed. It is evident that there is positive asymmetric pricing in the monopoly, Cournot and Stackelberg models as the cost pass-through is increasing with respect to the cost. For the Bertrand cases, the asymmetry is also positive but it appears to be almost non-existent as the slope of the cost pass-through is very close to zero, especially as δ gets closer to 1. By construction, in the perfect competition case, there is symmetric pricing; therefore, ρ(c) is completely flat.
Second, in order to determine whether the magnitude of the positive asymmetry depends on the market structure, we need to measure the asymmetry first. As discussed in previous sections, asymmetric pricing means that for an identical percentage increase and decrease in the cost, the percentage change in the price is not identical. To illustrate the asymmetry, this paper is measures it as the percentage deviation between the percentage increase in the price when the cost grows by x% with respect to the percentage decrease in the price when the cost falls by x%. Therefore, a value of 0% means no asymmetry, a positive percentage indicates positive asymmetry, and a negative percentage represents a negative asymmetry. Figures 3 and 4 contain this asymmetry measure for the six demand cases, considering an initial value for the marginal cost, 0 , of 0.5 and 2.0, respectively (Note 12). Both figures show the most asymmetric model on the left and the most symmetric one (perfect competition scenario) on the right. We can observe from both figures that the magnitude of the asymmetric pricing differs across all models depending not only on the parameter values of the demand function, but on the value of the marginal cost as well. For instance, for an identical 60 percentage increase and decrease when 0 = 0.5, the asymmetry in the monopoly, Cournot and Stackelberg models are 2.87 %, 2.65% and 1.74% respectively when = 1 and = 2; but they are 2.56 %, 2.42% and 1.52%, respectively when = 2 and = 2.5.
Even though the magnitudes of the asymmetry do differ, some generalities can be drawn by comparing both figures: a) the monopoly case exhibits the greatest asymmetry, followed by the Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertrand models, respectively, in almost all the cases but for = 0.5 and = 1.6 with 0 = 2.0; b) within the Bertrand cases, the closer is to 1, the closer the magnitude of the asymmetry is to the perfect competition scenario, which means almost non-asymmetry at all. However, in order to determine whether these generalities can hold for the 25 different values of the marginal cost, a new measure that allows comparison of the magnitude of the asymmetry across all models is required. (2015) pointed out, the positive (negative) asymmetric cost pass-through needs a pricing function that is convex (concave) in costs. This setup is similar to the risk aversion framework, in which aversion to (love of) risk implies that utility function must be oncave (convex). The similarities for both frameworks are that the first derivate of the function of interest (price and utility, respectively) gives the marginal changes, while the second derivate is not itself a meaningful measure of concavity in economic theory but helps us to identify the type of asymmetric pricing or preferences regarding risk, respectively. Therefore, as the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion (ARA) is used to compare risk aversion, in order to make a comparison of the asymmetric magnitude, this paper uses the ARA adapted to this framework as follows: where is denoted as the asymmetric coefficient and can be considered as the convexity (concavity) of the pricing function at point . The difference between and the ARA is that the former is the absolute value of the ratio of the second derivate to the first derivate in order to allow all possible combinations of signs to appear. For instance, if the first derivate of the pricing function is concave on costs, the ARA could give us both positive and negative values. However, as the objective here is to compare the magnitudes, we require all values to be positive. It is worth pointing out that before using the asymmetric coefficient, we must control by the type of asymmetry we are dealing with (Note 13). Figure 5 shows how this asymmetry coefficient looks for the six demand functions. As expected, the coefficient captures the findings of figures 3 and 4: for = 0.5 and = 1.6, the most asymmetric model is monopoly when = 0.5, and Stackelberg when = 2.0, respectively. Moreover, it tells us that if we are in a market where = 0.5 and = 1.6, if is lower than 1.9, the most asymmetric model is the monopoly; if c is greater than 1.9, the most asymmetric one is Stackelberg. For each of the other five demand functions, the asymmetric coefficient indicates that we can rank the traditional economic competition models by the magnitude of positive asymmetric pricing as follows: monopoly, Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertrand. Within the Bertrand model, there are some values of c for which the second generality does not hold, especially when = 5 and = 4. First, as we expected, Table 1 confirms that just by changing the assumption of the demand form, asymmetric pricing emerges as a natural response in the very well-known economic competition models. For all the models and given the parameter values for the simulations, positive asymmetry seems to be the norm. For the monopoly, Cournot and Stackelberg models, positive asymmetry is found in all cases. Within the Bertrand model, we can see that the positive asymmetry is more frequent when: a) given that the cross-price elasticity is identical for both demands ( 1 = 2 = ), this coefficient gets lower (i.e. when = 0.99, 82% of the cases present positive asymmetry, but when = 0.90, this percentage increases to 99.3%); and b) when the goods are more differentiated (i.e. when 1 = 0.99 and 2 = 0.95, 90.8% and 91,6% of the cases present positive asymmetry in the price adjustment for firm 1 and 2, respectively, but when Second, in order to find out which model generates the most positive asymmetric price response, this paper calculates the asymmetry coefficient described in the previous subsection for all cases where positive asymmetry is found. Tables  2, 3 and 4 show the comparison of this coefficient between the models with homogenous goods, models with homogenous goods and Bertrand when the price chosen by both firms is the same ( 1 = 2 ), and within Bertrand scenarios, respectively. For a more detailed analysis, the results in all these tables are subdivided by some levels of the marginal cost and .
Analysing the Price Responses of the 2116 Demand Functions
Model
Δρ/Δc > 0 Δρ/Δc < 0 Table 2 . Frequency count of possible scenarios comparing the monopoly, Cournot and Stackelberg models From Table 2 , it can be appreciated that the market power is reflected in the magnitude of the asymmetry as, in 98% of all cases, the asymmetric coefficient in the monopoly model is the greatest, followed by Cournot and Stackelberg. This result is robust for any level of marginal cost and . This is a very intuitive result as in an environment of non-competition, the firm(s) can take advantage of this market power by not only setting a higher price (Note 14) but also by increasing the price more strongly than decreasing it in response to an identically-sized cost change.
In addition, it is intended to add the Bertrand with non-homogenous goods model to the previous comparison. In a very strict sense, they are different models and in general comparing them will be like comparing potatoes with chickens. However, a comparison between them is still valid and relevant as when 1 = 2 , the goods are homogenous, so just one price arises. Therefore, under this scenario, the Bertrand model looks like the Cournot model but with the price as the control variable instead of the output level (Note 15). The comparison results shown in Table 3 indicates that in general the Bertrand model is the least asymmetric one with a frequency count of occurrence greater than 96%. Again, this is a very intuitive result as it reflects the fact that in the Bertrand model, when a firm is deciding the price level for its good, the firm has to take into account that consumers are willing to buy the identical good to the other firm, which may be offering it at a lower price. Therefore, the mere existence of cross-price demand elasticity translates into less market power, which results in a small magnitude of asymmetric pricing.
The comparison within the Bertrand model can be found in Table 4 , from which some generalities can be inferred. First, it can be observed that for the homogeneous case, the asymmetry magnitude is inversely related with the value of as Bertrand with = 0.90 is the most asymmetric, followed by Bertrand with = 0.95 and Bertrand with = 0.99 in 91.7 % of the cases. As captures the impact that one price firm has on the demand of the other good, these results reflect the fact that the smaller the substitution between the goods is, the greater the market power the firm has, which results in a greater magnitude of asymmetric pricing.
Second, for the non-homogenous case, the simulation results show that the number of cases in which the price of firm 2 is more asymmetric than the price of firm 1 increases from 77.1% to 99.9 % when 2 gets smaller than 1 . As a smaller value translates into a smaller cross-price demand elasticity for firm , the intuition of this result is that the firm that has the lower cross-price demand elasticity, has more market power, and, thus, takes advantage of this situation by imposing the highest positive asymmetric price adjustment. Table 3 . Frequency count of possible scenarios comparing the monopoly, Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertrand ( 1 = 2 ) models Note: Bertrand F1 denotes results associated with the price chosen by firm 1 in the Bertrand model, while Bertrand F2 denotes the ones associated with firm 2.
Finally, it can be seen that the magnitude of the asymmetry is greater when 2 = 0.90 than when 2 =0.95 in 92.1% and 100% of the cases for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. This result is very intuitive as it represents that when the differentiation between the two goods increases, the market power of both firms increases, and thus, by taking advantage of this situation, both firms charge prices that entail a greater magnitude of positive asymmetric cost pass-through.
Conclusions
Much of the existing literature on asymmetric cost pass-through has claimed that the standard pricing theory cannot account for this phenomenon. However, Ritz (2015) showed that under constant marginal costs, a log concave demand function is a sufficient condition for the existence of positive asymmetric pricing in the standard monopoly and Cournot models. This article follows Ritz (2015) and extend his findings to the Stackelberg and Bertrand framework. Furthermore, based on simulations, this paper compares the magnitudes of asymmetry generated in the standard economic competition models. The contributions of this article to the literature on the asymmetric cost pass-through are compelling. First, this paper has shown that, even with constant marginal costs, two of the classic standard economic competition models, Stackelberg with homogenous goods and Bertrand with non-homogenous goods, can account for the asymmetric pricing phenomenon in terms of magnitude just by allowing the demand function to be log-concave. Second, the simulation results indicate that the magnitude of positive asymmetric pricing is positively related to market power, which implies that the monopoly model is the most asymmetric one, followed by Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertrand. Furthermore, within the Bertrand model, cross-price demand elasticity and the difference between the goods play an important role in predicting the magnitude of asymmetry, as either a lower value of the former or a higher value of the latter, implies more market power, which translates into a greater magnitude of asymmetry From a policy perspective, it has been shown that in a market with a log-concave demand and constant marginal costs, the mere existence of asymmetric pricing is a clear sign of a non-perfect competitive market and that the greater the magnitude of the asymmetry, the greater the market power as well. Therefore, policy authorities should consider those results, as the asymmetric price adjustment is a useful tool in understanding competition in a market. Further research for the case in which the marginal costs are non-constant remains a pending task for the future. 
